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CORPORATE PLAINTIFFS IN LIBEL ACTIONS: 
ROSENBLOOM RESURRECTED? 
Corporations, like natural persons, have always desired redress 
from unwarranted assaults on their good names. Maintenance of a 
good reputation is a necessary component of a corporation's poten­
tial for profit, since customers' decisions are often influenced by 
their perceptions of the corporation's image. The vast amounts of 
money expended on corporate advertising indicate the importance 
which corporations attach to maintaining an exemplary public pro­
file. The approach taken by one federal district court decision 
involving a corporate libel action, however, handicaps many small 
corporations in defending their reputations against unwarranted as­
saults. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper! resur­
rected the Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 2 issue-based test for 
determining the applicability of the actual malice standard to a cor­
porate plaintiff. 
The Rosenbloom test, totally rejected by the United States Su­
preme Court as it applies to natural persons, demands that a plain­
tiff in a libel action prove that the defendant published the alleged 
libelous statement with actual malice whenever matters of general 
or public interest are involved. Because the Rosenbloom test ig­
nores the status of the defamed plaintiff as either public or private 
figure, the Martin Marietta decision imposes the almost insur­
mountable actual malice standard on corporate plaintiffs based 
solely on their corporate status and the presence of a public contro­
versy. Important factors such as the corporation's size, purpose, or 
activities do not enter into the decision. This judicial approach to 
the defamation of corporations, if extensively followed, could dam­
age the continued vitality of many such entities. 
The common law presumed damages in actions for libel from 
the fact of publication. 3 Courts applied this rule to individuals and 
1. 417 F. Supp. 947 (D. D.C. 1976). 
2. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The status oriented public figure standard established by 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), supposedly superseded the issue­
based standard of Rosenbloom. The court in Martin Marietta, however, distin­
guished Gertz as applying only to private persons. It found the Rosenbloom test best 
suited to simultaneously protect both first amendment considerations and corporate 
reputations. See 417 F. Supp. at 956. See also Comment, In Search of the Corporate 
Private Figure: Defamation of the Corporation, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 339, 358-60 
(1978). 
3. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262 (1964). 
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corporations alike. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,4 however, 
the United States Supreme Court held that under the first amend­
ment, public officials cannot recover damages in a libel action un­
less the defendant's publication was found to have been made with 
actual malice. 5 Actual malice was defined as publication "with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not."6 The Court required that actual malice be proved 
with "convincing clarity."7 
Since New York Times, the Court has had occasion to expand 
and further clarify the situations in which a plaintiff must prove ac­
tual malice before recovery will be permitted. One of the most sig­
nificant extensions was the inclusion of "public figures"8 within the 
structures of the standard. 9 This comment seeks to determine if 
the opinion in Martin Marietta, to the extent it relies on the 
Rosenbloom test, comports with the Supreme Court decisions after 
New York Times. The difficulties encountered by the Court in fash­
ioning and applying a proper constitutional test for libel actions will 
be analyzed as they particularly relate to corporations. Two other 
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
5. Id. at 279-80. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 285-86. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Supreme 
Court refined its definition of actual malice by explaining: "[R]eckless conduct is not 
measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would 
have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to pennit the 
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his 
publication." Id. at 731-32. 
8. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court in Butts de­
fined public figures as those persons who are "intimately involved in the resolution 
of important public questions or [who], by reason of their fame, shape events in 
areas of concern to society at large." Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
9. New York Times Co. announced that a person who held a position in the 
governmental structure (a public official) was required to prove publication with ac­
tual malice as a prerequisite to recovery in a libel action against a mass media de­
fendant. 376 U.S. 254. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the ac­
tual malice standard was extended to those persons classified as public figures. In 
Rosenbloom, a plurality of the Court detennined that the protection of the New York 
Times rule should apply to any statement concerning "a matter ... of public or gen­
eral interest," whether involVing a private or public individual. 403 U.S. at 43. Three 
years later, however, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court 
returned to a test based on the status of the plaintiff as public official or public fig­
ure. Finally, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court's most recent 
decision concerning the actual malice standard, an effort was made to more clearly 
define the standards a plaintiff must meet in order to qualify as a public figure. The 
Court held that to be considered a public figure requires the person to be prominent 
in the affairs of society or exert influence over public controversies. Id. at 453. The 
Court's success in its attempted clarification is the subject of present debate. 
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federal district court caseslO dealing with the application of the ac­
tual malice standard to a corporate plaintiff will be compared with 
the Martin Marietta opinion. Finally, the comment proposes crite­
ria to be used in a court's determination of the proper classification 
of the corporate plaintiff. 
In Martin Marietta, an article in the Washington Star reported 
that the Martin Marietta Corporation, a defense contractor, had 
given a "stag" party for a soon to be married "top Air Force offi­
cial" at which one-third of the forty to fifty guests were Depart­
ment of Defense personnel. ll The article stated that one of two 
prostitutes attending the party was paid $3,000 "by a Martin 
Marietta representative. "12 The article claimed that one of the 
prostitutes "reportedly swung naked from the antlers of an animal 
head mounted on one of the lodge's walls."13 Martin Marietta insti­
tuted a libel action against the newspaper seeking $5,000,000 in 
compensatory damages, $lO,OOO,OOO in punitive damages, and an 
injunction requiring the Star to print a retraction admitting the fal­
sity of the story.14 In finding for the defendant, the district court 
held that the contents of the article involved matters of "public or 
general interest"15 or, alternatively, that Martin Marietta was a 
"public figure"16 for the purposes of the issue involved because it 
had thrust itself into a matter of public controversy.17 On either 
10. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 
1977); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
11. 417 F. Supp. at 950. 
12. [d. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. at 949. These figures were not based on any lost revenues, but were in­
stead based purely on what counsel considered to be just compensation for the harm 
done. 
15. [d. at 954. The use of the public or general interest standard was based on 
Rosenbloom. The Supreme Court held there that publications which concerned mat­
ters of general interest were constitutionally protected unless the plaintiff could 
prove publication with actual malice. 403 U.S. 29. 
The district court relied on the public or general 'interest standard despite the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), 
repudiating Rosenbloom without qualification. The court justified its application of 
the Rosenbloom test on the grounds that the Gertz decision was directed solely at in­
dividuals and that, "[Tlhe values considered important enough to merit accommoda­
tion with interests protected by the first amendment are associated solely with natu­
ral persons, and that corporations, while legal persons for some purposes, possess 
none of the attributes the Court sought to protect." 417 F. Supp. at 955. 
16. [d. at 956. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
17. 417 F. Supp. at 957. Martin Marietta had voluntarily decided to compete for 
defense contracts and to entertain persons associated with the military to enhance its 
chances of obtaining defense contracts. By so doing, Martin Marietta had voluntarily 
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basis, Martin Marietta was required to prove actual malice as a 
prerequisite to recovery. The plaintiff, as a matter of law, was 
unable to meet this burden. 18 
The Martin Marietta decision is not significant because of the 
result reached by the court. The actual malice standard clearly ap­
plies under the public figure approach mandated for natural per­
sons. The decision's importance arises from its reliance, albeit by 
way of an alternative holding, on the issue-based Rosenbloom test. 
The Martin Marietta court's assumption that the issue-based test 
adequately protects all corporation bears close examination. Be­
cause libel cases require courts to balance the plaintiff's right to 
protect its reputation against the competing right of a defendant to 
speak freely, the law of libel necessarily embraces the first amend­
ment. 
Before the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times,19 li­
belous publications were considered to be a "class of speech wholly 
unprotected by the First Amendment...."20 In New Yark Times, 
however, the Court recognized the competing interests at issue in 
libel actions. The Court held that insofar as public officials are con­
cerned, the balance must be struck in favor of free speech and 
21press. The United States Supreme Court applied the same ra­
tionale in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,22 holding that public fig­
ures must prove publication with actual malice. In Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc. ,23 the plurality decision of the Court went still 
further, by holding that the actual malice standard applied to defa­
mations of those involved in matters of public or general interest. 24 
More recently, however, one federal district court has ruled 
"that the Rosenbloom plurality failed, for constitutional purposes at 
least, to allow the states sufficient latitude to protect private indi­
viduals from libel."25 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 26 the United 
thrust itself into the ongoing controversy regarding improper procurement of defense 
work. The act of thrusting oneself into a matter of public controversy was one of the 
bases for classification as a public figure enunciated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323 (1974). See also note 35 infra. 
18. 417 F. Supp. at 949. 
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
20. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974). 
21. 376 U.S. at 268. See also note 8 supra. 
22. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See also notes 8-9 supra. 
23. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
24. ld. at 44. See also note 8 supra. 
25. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 167, 172 (D.D.C. 
1977). 
26. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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States Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not require 
application of the actual malice standard when a private individual 
commences a libel suit. It held that the states' legitimate interest 
in protecting the reputations of private individuals is strong enough 
to justify permitting such pe~sons to recover damages from publish­
ers or broadcasters under any standard short. of liability without 
fault. 27 The Court in Time Inc. v. Firestone,28 neither specifically 
. expanded nor contracted the scope of the standard, but instead at­
tempted a further refinement of the ambit of the public figure clas­
sification. In determining the status of the plaintiff, the Court 
looked to whether the defamed party voluntarily thrust itself into a 
controversy which itself constitutes an area of legitimate public in­
terest. 29 
In Gertz, the Supreme Court sought to achieve a more 
"proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the 
freedom of speech and press"30 when a private individual was the 
object of a libelous statement. The Gertz Court felt that the plural­
ity test proposed in Rosenbloom,31 which made no differentiation 
between public and private individuals, did not adequately con­
sider the state's legitimate interest in protecting private individuals 
27. Id. at 347. 
28. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
29. Id. at 453. Although the Gertz-Firestone formula potentially takes the sub­
ject matter of the libellous statement into account, its primary focus remains on the 
private versus public character of the plaintiff. This totally opposes the Rosenbloom 
test as advocated by the court in Martin Marietta. Rosenbloom fails to differentiate 
between the public and private plaintiff, but imposes a malice standard solely on the 
basis of the newsworthiness of the statement. 
30. 418 U.S. at 325. The case has been extensively noted. See Comment, 
Defamation-Corporotion Held a "Person" Subject to the Gertz Test for Deter­
mining Liability in a Defamation Case, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1287, 1291 n.42 
(1977), listing discussions of the opinion including: Brosnahan, From Times v. 
Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amend­
ment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (1975); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation 
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. 
REV. 1349 (1975); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 1205 (1976); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In 
Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199 (1976); Comment, Reply 
and Retraction in Actions Against the Press for Defamation: The Effect of Tornillo 
and Gertz, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 223 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 41, 139 (1974). Gertz also constituted the first attempt by the Su­
preme Court to establish guidelines for lower courts as to the determination of 
a public figure. For a discussion of these guidelines, see Comment, Defama­
tion-Corporation Held a "Person" Subject to the Gertz Test for Determining Liabil­
ity in a Defamation Case, supra at 1292-93. 
31. 403 U.S. at 43. See text accompanying note 24 supra. 
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from the harm inflicted upon them by libelous publications. 32 To 
accommodate these goals, the Rosenbloom test of the public or 
general interest was abandoned. 33 In its place, the Gertz Court 
substituted a standard which made the status of the plaintiff, as ei­
ther public official or public figure,34 the determinative factor. 35 
Under the new test, the subject matter or issue of the publication 
was not decisive. 
Several factors prompted the Court to abandon the Rosen­
bloom test. First, the Court recognized that "[p]ublic officials and 
public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the chan­
nels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic 
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals 
normally enjoy. "36 As a result of their lack of "effective opportuni­
ties for rebuttal,"37 private individuals are more vulnerable to in­
32. 418 U.S. at 341. The Court quoted Justice Stewart, concurring in Rosenblatt 
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), to emphasize that the individual's interest in the protec­
tion of his good name "reflects no more than ou.r basic concept of the essential dig­
nity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of 
ordered liberty." [d. at 92. See also text accompanying note 27 supra. 
33. 418 U.S. at 346. 
34. The Court defined those subject to public figure status as "[tlhose who, by 
reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which 
they seek the public's attention, are properly classed as public figures...." [d. at 
342. 
35. [d. at 343. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Powell stated that the sta­
tus as public figure or public official was dependent upon the following: 
That deSignation may rest on either of two alternative bases. In some in­
stances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he 
becomes a public figure for all purposes in all contexts. More commonly, an 
individual voluntarily injects himself ... for a limited range of issues. In ei­
ther case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of pub­
lic questions. 
[d. at 351. 
36. [d. at 344 (footnote omitted). The remedy of self-help was recognized as a 
function of access to available opportunities to refute the libelous statement and 
thereby undo or minimize any harm done to reputation. The Court, however, stated 
in a footnote: 
Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of de­
famatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experi­
ence that the truth rarely catches up with a lie. But the fact that the self-help 
remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean 
that it is irrelevant to our inquiry. 
ld. at 344 n.9. This language indicates the Court's astute pragmatism in recognizing 
the difficulty in erasing the harm caused by a libelous statement. The effect is simi­
lar to that upon a jury when it hears or sees evidence; no matter how strong the ad­
monition to disregard, the fact remains that the evidence has been seen and is sel­
dom forgotten. 
37. [d. at 344. 
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jury and, therefore, require greater protection. "[T]he state inter­
est in protecting them is correspondingly greater. "38 
Second, the Court determined that public officials and public 
figures "must accept certain necessary consequences"39 of their in­
volvement in public affairs or matters placing them in the public 
spotlight. In both instances, "they invite attention and com­
ment. "40 The Court considered that public officials and public fig­
ures had voluntarily exposed themselves to the increased risks of 
defamatory falsehoods concerning them. It found no similar justifi­
cation for such an assumption with respect to private individuals 
since they had "not accepted public office or assumed an 'influen­
tial role in ordering society.' "41 Therefore, the Court reasoned 
that not only are private individuals more vulnerable to injury, but 
also they are more deserving of recovery. 42 
Third, the Court feared that the Rosenbloom test would force 
"state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publi­
cations address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do 
not-to determine, in the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, 'what in­
formation is relevant to self-government.' "43 The Court "doubt[ed] 
the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges."44 
Finally, the Supreme Court determined that the Rosenbloom 
test inadequately served "both of the competing values at stake"45 
in a libel action. It considered, on the one hand, that a private in­
dividual would face the difficult task of proving actual malice if 
38. [d. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. at 345. 
41. [d. (citation omitted). Although the quotation refers to "private individual," 
the specific rationales deemed important have application to corporations as well. 
Nothing in the quoted language limits its relevance to the corporate plaintiff except 
for the Court's phraseology, namely, "private individual." Yet it seems clear that this 
title is capable of broad meaning. 
The broad scope of Gertz was emphasized by the Court when it stated: 
Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each par­
ticular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general applica­
tion. Such rules necessarily treat alike various cases involving differences as 
well as similarities. Thus it is often true that not all of the considerations 
which justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each particular case de­
cided under its authority. 
418 U.S. at 343-44. 
42. The Court stated, "He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protec­
tion of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the 
courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood." [d. at 345. 
43. 418 U.S. at 346 (quoting Marshall, J., dissenting in Rosenbloom). 
44. [d. 
45. [d. See also note 21 supra and accompanying text. 
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matters of public or general interest were concerned. This result 
would ignore the greater state interest in protecting private indi­
viduals than public persons. On the other hand, the Court rea­
soned that the careful broadcaster or publisher who happened to 
make an error in a situation where matters of public or general in­
terest were not involved could be held liable in damages. Such a 
result could unduly inhibit vigorous, aggressive journalism. As a 
consequence of these factors, the Court in Gertz held that so long 
as liability is not imposed without fault, states could determine 
their own standard of liability for libelous publications injurious to 
private individuals. 46 
The Rosenbloom test has been replaced by a more equitable 
standard that emphasizes the public figure-private individual dis­
tinction. The premises which served as a foundation for the Court's 
holding in Gertz have similar utility when applied to corpora­
tions. 47 Continued reliance on the principles of Rosenbloom in libel 
46. Id. at 347. 
47. Despite the Court's failure to address the issue of corporate applicability, 
lower courts, both state and federal, had applied the actual malice standard to corpo­
rations in a Significant number of pre-Gertz cases. Where a corporation was found to 
be involved in activities closely related to a governmental function, it was held to be 
a public official. Doctors Convalescent Center v. East Shore Newspapers, 104 Ill. 
App. 2d 271, 244 N.E.2d 373 (1968) (nursing home which was licensed by state de­
partment of health and some of whose patients were mentally retarded children 
placed in the home as wards of the state held to be public official). 
Anomer group of cases held that the actual malice standard applied because the 
involved corporation was a public figure. See, e.g., Gospel Spreading Church v. 
Johnson Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (church criticized for its real 
estate investments, held to be a public figure); Bavarian Motor Works, Ltd. v. 
Manchester, 61 Misc. 2d 309, 305 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (court held that the 
status as a public figure or not was the determinative factor); see also Stevens, Pri­
vate Enterprise and Public Reputation: Defamation and the Corporate Plaintiff, 12 
AM. Bus. L.J. 281, 285 (1975). 
More often, however, the courts required a showing of actual malice because the 
corporation was found to be involved in matters of public or general interest. See, 
e.g., Robinson v. American Broadcasting Cos., 441 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1971); Bel Air 
Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); United Medical Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
394 U.S. 921 (1969); Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 154 (D. Mont. 
1973); Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc. v. Newsday, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 437, 334 N.Y.S.2d 
324 (Sup. Ct. 1972). Many of the cases which applied the public or general interest 
rule to corporations, e.g., Beatty v. Ellings, 285 Minn. 293, 173 N.W.2d 12 (1968), 
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970); Kruteck v. Schimmel, 27 App. Div. 2d 837, 278 
N.Y.S.2d 25 (1967), predated Rosenbloom where that rule was first announced. This 
apparently resulted from the lower court's erroneous interpretation of language in 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), which seemed to indicate that 
matters of public interest had to be involved before a person could be found to be a 
public figure. The Court in Butts defined public figures as those who are "intimately 
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actions commenced by a corporate plaintiff would leave many small 
corporations weaponless against libel merely because the subject 
matter of the libel was in the public or general interest. 
Martin Marietta marked the first post-Gertz judicial encounter 
with the issue of the proper standard to apply to corporate plain­
tiffs in libel actions. 48 According to the court, the actual malice 
standard applied because the alleged libelous article published by 
the Washington Star concerned matters of public or general inter­
est.49 This approach rendered the public figure standard as refined 
in Gertz inapplicable to corporations. 50 
The values which the district court considered important to 
the Gertz decision, namely "the essential dignity and worth of ev­
ery human being" and "the protection of private personality,"51 
were held to be solely attributable to natural persons.52 The Mar-
involved in the resolution of important public questions or [who], by reason of their 
fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large." Id. at 164. See also note 8 
supra. The reliance of lower courts on the public or general interest rule is signifi ­
cant because it indicates that the scope of the application of the actual malice 
standard was not at all clear after Butts. Furthermore, the large number of decisions 
applying the public or general interest rule may have added credence and support to 
the Court's adoption of that rule in Rosenbloom. For a good discussion of the 
standards applied by the courts and a wealth of citations for the period 1967 to 1974, 
see Stevens, Private Enterprise and Public Reputation: Defamation and the Corpo­
rate Plaintiff, supra at 283-86. 
The courts had little difficulty applying the actual malice standard to corpora­
tions in the pre-Gertz era. Although the bases upon which the decisions were based 
often differed, the results most often were the same; the corporation involved was re­
quired to prove publication with actual malice as a prerequisite to recovery. 
48. As Judge Schwargen noted in Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated 
Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977), "The instant motion requires the Court to 
determine the First Amendment standard applicable where the plaintiff is a corpora­
tion rather than a natural person. Only one reported decision appears to have consid­
ered the issue. Martin Marietta . ..." Id. at 819. The difficulty of the issue was also 
recognized by the court in Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D. N.Y. 
1977), when it stated, "In attempting to apply this 'public figure' analysis to corpora­
tions as opposed to natural persons, courts have differed in their method of analysis." 
Id. at 1347. 
49. 417 F. Supp. at 955. See also note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
50. Id. The decision requiring proof of publication with actual malice was also 
based on the alternative ground that Martin Marietta was a public figure. See text ac­
companying note 16 supra and notes 82-83 infra. The court stated, "[ilf, however, 
higher courts, which have yet to consider the problem, should find it necessary to fit 
corporate plaintiffs into this ill-fitting mold, this court concludes that Martin Marietta 
is a public figure for the purposes of the instant action and, consequently, must 
prove actual malice." Id. at 956. Thus, the standard applied to Martin Marietta did 
not vary the result. Id. 
51. 418 U.S. at 341. 
52. As the court stated: 

It is quite clear from the Court's [Gertz] opinion, however, that the values 
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tin Marietta court relied on the premise that a corporation, regard­
less of its size, nature, or activities, possessed no personal life. 53 
According to Judge Flannery, the traditional distinction "between 
corporate and human plaintiffs ... limit[s] corporate recovery to 
actual damages in the form of lost profits."54 Unlike an action for li-
considered important enough to merit accommodation with interests pro­
tected by the first amendment are associated solely with natural persons, 
and that corporations, while legal persons for some purposes, possess none 
of the attributes the Court sought to protect. 
417 F. Supp. at 955. 
53. As a final justification for rejecting the Gertz standard in the case of the cor­
porate libel plaintiff, the court cited the recently decided case of Time, Inc. v. Fire­
stone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 417 F. Supp. at 955-56. Firestone constituted a refine­
ment of the public figure classification by requiring that a party voluntarily thrust 
himself into a controversy and that the controversy itself be of legitimate public in­
terest. See note 28-29 supra and accompanying text. The Martin Marietta court con­
cluded that, since "no event in the life of a corporation involves such sacred and per­
sonal events as marriage and divorce," the highly personal controversies the court 
sought to protect in Gertz could never be associated with corporate activity. 417 F. 
Supp. at 955-56. 
54. 417 F. Supp. at 955. On the other hand, natural persons have always been 
allowed recovery of special and punitive damages for harm to their personal reputa­
tions and damage to their psyches. 
At common law, a corporation traditionally had a right to protect its good name 
from libelous attack. See, e.g., Trenton Mut. Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 
N.J.L. 402 (Sup. Ct. 1852); Shoe and Leather Bank v. Thompson, 18 Abb. Pro 413 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865). Although a corporation had no personal reputation and could 
not be subject to mental anguish, as a natural person could (see, e.g., Diplomat Elec. 
Inc. V. Westinghouse Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1967); Golden Palace, Inc. 
V. NBC, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 107 (D. D.C. 1974); Eason Publication v. Atlanta Gazette, 
141 Ga. App. 321, 233 S.E.2d 232 (1977», it did have prestige and standing in the 
business community which could be injured by a defamatory attack. E.g., Pullman 
Standard Car Mfg. CO. V. Local 2928, United Steel Workers, 152 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 
1945), Digiorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350 
(1963). It has been said, "language which casts an aspersion upon [a corporation's] 
honesty, credit, efficiency or other business character may be actionable." W. 
PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 111, at 745 (4th ed. 1971); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC­
OND) TORTS, § 561(1) (1977). Further, corporations were permitted to allege that 
defamations aimed at them were libelous per se. This meant an action was maintain­
able without proof of special damages if the charge was defamatory and if it injuri­
ously and directly affected the credibility of the corporation thereby causing pecuni­
ary loss. E.g., Brayton V. Crowell Publishing Co., 205 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1953). See 
also Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local 2928, United Steel Workers, 152 F.2d 
493 (7th Cir. 1945), where the court stated, "[in] determining what constitutes libel 
per se, the courts have often asked: Will the defamatory matter injure the credit, 
property, or business of the corporation?" Id. at 496. The court added that a matter 
attacking a person's reputation for honesty and veracity is also libelous per se and 
the same standard should be applied to the corporate plaintiff. Id. But see Note, Cor­
porate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to Personal 
Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 983 (1975). Courts have agreed that the only 
manifestation of the injury suffered by a corporation is a loss of business and the 
commensurate decrease in income. E.g., Digiorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. 
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bel brought by a private individual, it concluded that a corporate 
libel action was devoid of matters "'basic [to] our constitutional 
system,' and need not force the first amendment to yield as far as 
it would be [sic] in a private libel action. "55 
Judge Flannery reasoned,however, that it would be unjust to 
apply the malice standard to any libel action brought by a corpo­
rate plaintiff. 56 Instead, he believed that the Rosenbloom standard 
of requiring proof of actual malice "where issues of legitimate pub­
lic concern are discussed, "57 afforded corporations sufficient protec­
tion from libelous attacks. Thus, he held that the issue-based 
standard of Rosenbloom properly balanced the interests of first 
amendment rights and the protection of the corporate reputation in 
libel actions instituted by a corporation. 58 
Although the Martin Marietta opinion is well reasoned in 
some respects, it fails in several crucial aspects to confront the full 
impact of Gertz and the practicalities of corporate existence. Gertz 
recognized the protection of the reputation of private individuals as 
a legitimate interest of the state. 59 Similarly, a state desires to pro­
tect the reputations of "corporate individuals" whom it has fos­
tered, because corporations occupy an important position in the 
structure of modern society. 
Although a corporation cannot suffer mental anguish,60 it can 
suffer harm to its business reputation in the community as a conse­
quence of a libel. The ability of a corporation to function within a 
community rests largely on its ability to develop goodwill within 
that community. Furthermore, the economic damage suffered by a 
corporation grows in significance in light of the fact that corpora­
tions have only an economic component. Economic damage to a 
corporation threatens its continued existence. 
App. 2d 560, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1963). C/. Stov v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 407 F.2d 
1318 (3d Cir. 1969) (bank wrongfully dishonored one of plaintiff's checks which re­
sulted in harm to plaintiff's reputation and subsequent loss of business, court 
awarded damages equaling two years' lost profits). 
55. 417 F. Supp. at 955. Justice Stewart, concurring in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 
U.S. 75, 95 (1966), had observed that one of the basic goals of our constitutional sys­
tem is to protect individuals' reputations. See also note 32 and text accompanying 
note 29 supra. 
56~ 417 F. Supp. at 956. 
57. Id. See also text accompanying notes 23-24 supra. 
58. The court stated, "[t1his approach grants some deference to the values un­
derlying corporate libel actions grounded in state law, while at the same time re­
sulting in only a minor encroachment on the first amendment, which was designed 
primarily to defend the market place of ideas." Id. 
59. See text accompanying note 27 supra. 
60. See note 54 supra. 
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Corporate libel actions are justified by the need for a corpo­
rate recovery. Although a libelous statement aimed at a corporation 
often reflects directly on the corporate officers who may also have 
individual causes of action against the libellant, individual recovery 
does not compensate the corporation. A libelous attack on the cor­
poration would result in economic losses to that corporation. These 
losses would probably be sustained by the stockholders who would 
remain uncompensated through actions brough by individuals. Be­
cause the stockholders have no individual cause of action, their 
only recovery is through a corporate libel suit. The nexus between 
individual reputations and corporate defamation militates toward 
similar treatment for corporations and natural persons. This nexus 
is especially strong when the defamatory statement is directed 
against the mom and pop-type corporation. In this situation, the 
public is likely to equate the corporate reputation of Mom & Pop, 
Inc. with that of mom and pop. Consequently, a judgment against 
the corporation is,_ in effect, a judgment against those who direct 
the company. In this respect, the consequences of libel against a 
corporation can approximate those suffered by an individual more 
than the Martin Marietta court recognized. 
Another similarity between corporations and individuals con­
cerns the ability to adequately reply to the alleged libel. Many 
small corporations lack the financial ability to purchase space in the 
local newspaper or time on the community radio station to refute 
the alleged defamatory remarks directed at them. Others are with­
out sufficient "news glamour" necessary to convince the local editor 
or station manager that they deserve equal time or space to retort. 
All in all, this type of corporation is subject to practical limitations 
equivalent to those facing individuals. 
Of course, Martin Marietta Corporation is not a Mom and Pop 
enterprise. No attempt is made here to equate the two. Neither is 
the point advanced that Martin Marietta should be allowed to 
freely wield a corporate libel suit under a rule designed to protect 
Mom and Pop. However, the vast differences between the two en­
terprises cannot be given proper effect by the issue-based Rosen­
bloom test. The shortcomings of the Rosenbloom test were recog­
nized by the court in Trans Warld Accounts v. Associated Press, 61 
which openly criticized the Rosenbloom test as adopted by Martin 
Marietta and applied the status-based test of Gertz and Firestone. 
61. 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
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In Trans World Accounts, the alleged libel arose out of an er­
roneous report published by the Associated Press (AP). The article 
mistakenly indicated that Trans World was being charged with four 
types of unfair and deceptive trade practices by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FfC).62 In fact, only two types of illegal activity were 
asserted by the FfC.63 In granting the defendant's motion for sum­
mary judgment, the court held that Trans World was a public fig­
ure as a result of having been "drawn into a particular public con­
troversy. "64 
In basing its holding on the Gertz public figure rationale, the 
Trans World court explicitly disagreed65 with the reasoning em­
ployed in Martin Marietta. In its view, the public or general inter­
est test had been rejected by the Supreme Court without qualifica­
tion. 66 More important, however, it found a basic flaw in the 
corporate-individual dichotomy relied upon in Martin Marietta. 
The court reasoned that although the libel cases decided by the 
Supreme Court had been premised on the idea of protecting the 
rights of individuals, "it is also true that the line between the inter­
ests of natural persons and corporations is frequently fuzzy and ill­
defined. "67 The various legal considerations which lead to decisions 
to incorporate often result in organizations being called corpora­
tions while they actually behave as either a partnership or sole pro­
prietorship. For this reason, the court found that for the purposes 
of applying the first amendment to libel actions "the distinction be­
tween corporation and individuals is one without a difference. "68 
62. ld. at 817. Specifically, the article indicated that the FTC was charging 
Trans World with (1) the use of collection forms in the form of urgent telegraphic 
messages, (2) the use of forms falsely stating that legal action was about to be insti ­
tuted, (3) the use of letters threatening debtors with damage to their credit ratings 
unless bills were promptly paid, and (4) falsely holding themselves out as bona fide 
collection agencies when, in fact, the companies were only mailing services engaged 
in sending out form letters to debtors. 
63. ld. The FTC noted that charges three and four were not being directed at 
Trans World. 
64. The court stated: 

[Trans World) cannot be said to have become a public figure by having 

achieved "pervasive fame or notoriety." Nor can it be said that it "voluntar­

ily inject[edl [itlself ... into a particular public controversy." But Gertz rec­

ognizes that a person may become a public figure for a limited range of is­

sues by having been "drawn into a particular public controversy." 

ld. at 819-20. See also note 35 supra. 
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The Rosenbloom test might suffice if all corporate entities 
were as large as General Motors or IBM. The Trans World court 
noted, however, that there are thousands of businesses incorpora­
ted in the United States, all varying in size and notoriety. To re­
vert to a test that failed to appreciate such differences would allow 
libel cases to turn on the ad hoc determinations regarding which 
items were matters of general or public interest. 69 Gertz con­
demned this methodology. 
The bankruptcy of the Rosenbloom test was also recognized by 
the court in Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's.70 In that case, an 
article appearing in Barron's71 analyzed the plaintiff's proposed 
public stock offering and the accounting incident to it. Barron's re­
ported that the purpose of the public offering was to serve the 
plaintiff's parent organization. 72 The article implied that the parent 
"was employing certain 'creative accounting' concepts and engaging 
in improprieties, bad business judgment and breach of fiduciary 
duties, all of which led to its decision to market" the stock issue. 73 
While the court found the article to be libelous, it granted Barron's 
motion for summary judgment, holding that as a result of the pub­
lic stock offering, Reliance had voluntarily thrust itself into the 
public arena thereby becoming a public figure. 74 Since the plaintiff 
could not prove publication with actual malice, it could not re­
cover. 75 
69. See text accompanying note 43 supra. 
70. 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
71. Barron's is a highly regarded publication in financial circles. The publica­
tion of the article in Barron's was likely to be widely read and relied upon by both 
brokerage houses and the investing public. Id. at 1345. 
72. The financial organization of the plaintiff was stated to be as follows: 
"Plaintiff Reliance Insurance Company ... is engaged in the property and casualty 
insurance and life insurance businesses. Of the common stock of Insurance, 96.9% is 
owned by Reliance Financial Services Corporation ... , the common stock of which 
in tum is wholly owned by Reliance Group Incorporated ...." Id. at 1344. 
73. Id. at 1345. 
74. Id. at 1348. The court explained the basis of its holding as follows: 
Filing a preliminary or red herring prospectus, a matter of public record, is 
theoretically not an offer to sell securities, which can be made only when 
the registration becomes final. But by doing so, an issuer thrusts itself into 
the public eye, indicating by its action that it intends to have the registration 
become complete and that the preliminary prospectus will mature into a fi­
nal one, with resultant distribution of securities to the public. 
Id. n.I. 
75. The holding in Reliance vividly illustrates the difficult burden imposed 
upon a plaintiff when the actual malice standard applies. The inequity of enlarging 
the scope of such an onerous rule was one of the determinative factors in the Gertz 
decision. To argue, as the Martin Marietta court does, that a plaintiff should be sub­
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Although the court did not explicitly disagree with the reason­
ing of Martin Marietta, it did note that courts have differed in 
their analyses. 76 The Reliance court held: "[T]he standard for 
determining whether or not a person or corporate entity is a public 
figure is set forth in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc .. ..."77 The court 
concluded that the reasoning of Gertz should apply to corporations 
as well as to natural persons. Implicit in this statement is a rejec­
tion of the reasoning in Martin Marietta. 
The approach taken by the Reliance and Trans World courts 
regarding corporate plaintiffs in libel actions has much to commend 
it. Focusing on the status of the plaintiff can spare a Mom and Pop 
corporation the rigors of proving actual malice on the part of a li­
bellant. At the same time, the status test of Gertz by no means lets 
corporations off easily. Indeed, the plaintiffs in both Reliance and 
Trans World had to prove actual malice and failed. The status­
based test allows a court to consider the quality and quantity of 
corporate activity. The issue-based test, on the other hand, re­
stricts a court to evaluating the subject matter of the libelous state­
ment. 
Further support for applying the status-based test to all plain­
tiffs, individual and corporate, can be found by examining the re­
finements added to the test in recent years. The United States Su­
preme Court has expressly recognized, in Time, Inc. v. Fire
stone,78 that a party can be classified as a public figure by having 
placed itself in a legitimate public controversy.79 This avenue for 
jected to the public or general interest standard with its concomitant greater likeli ­
hood of application of the actual malice rule, merely because the party happens to be 
a corporation, is both unfair and illogical. 
76. Id. at 1347. The judge cited only the Martin Marietta and Trans World 
cases and briefly discussed those courts' holdings. He also stated, "It appeared pref­
erable on this motion for summary judgment to follow Trans World Accounts, and 
consider whether Insurance is a public figure in accordance with the terms set forth 
in Gertz. See also, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, ...." Id. at 1347-48. 
77. Id. at 1347 (emphasis added). 
78. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 

79. 424 U.S. at 453. In contrast, the dissent reasoned: 

Having thus rejected the appropriateness of judicial inquiry into 'the legiti ­

macy of interest in a particular event or subject,' Gertz obviously did not in­

tend to sanction any such inquiry by its use of the term 'public contro­





Id. at 488 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. 
at 78, 79). Justice Marshall's concern about the Court's seeming retreat to a 
Rosenbloom type analysis has also been expressed by other commentators. See, e.g., 
McKenna, Time, Inc. v. Firestone: More Than A New Public Figure Standard?, 20 
ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 625 (1976); Comment, Time, Inc. v. Firestone: The Supreme Court's 
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becoming a public figure acknowledges that the subject matter of 
the libelous statement is gennane to the resolution of a libel action. 
This refinement of the Gertz approach limits the impact of the 
subject matter of the statement to the extent that the subject mat­
ter affects the plaintiffs status. In Reliance, for example, the reso­
lution of plaintiffs status as a public figure partially turned on the 
fact that the libelous statement concerned a matter of legitimate 
public concern, a stock offering. 80 
Rosenbloom fails to adequately serve "the competing values at 
stake" in a corporate libel action. Gertz properly recognizes those 
values, namely the protection of the private reputation and free­
dom of speech and press. 81 If, as Martin Marietta commands, 
proof of actual malice is required of corporate plaintiffs solely be­
cause matters of public or general interest are involved, the corpo­
ration's fate may have been determined upon incorporation. 
Countless small or obscure corporations invite little attention 
and comment, just as few individuals seek notoriety. To the small 
and relatively obscure corporation which often does not possess the 
financial reserves to recover from the harm follOwing a libelous 
publication, such libel may literally threaten its future existence. 
Under the flexible status-based test outlined in Gertz, a deserving 
corporation has a chance of vindicating its good name. 
All corporations are not the same merely because they consti­
tute the 'same basic type of legal entity. Since substantive differ­
ences exist among corporations, similarity in treatment is not justi­
fiable, at least in the libel context. The Martin Marietta court 
ignored these substantive differences when it applied the public or 
general interest standard. By its holding, the court grouped all cor­
porate plaintiffs together and imposed the inflexible and unreasona­
bly broad subject matter standard upon them. A far more equitable 
result would have been obtained if the court had based its conclu­
sion solely on the flexible rationale of Gertz, a standard which 
forces courts to individualize rather than generalize. 
Restrictive New Libel Ruling, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 435 (1976); Note, Time, Inc. v. 
Firestone: Is Rosenbloom Really Dead?, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 216 (1976). 
80. See Comment, In Search of the Corporate Private Figure: Defamation of 
the Corporation, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 339 (1977). This comment concludes that the 
corporate plaintiff is subject to the same judicial result regardless of whether the 
Gertz or the Rosenbloom test is used. 
81. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra. See also Comment, supra note 
80, at 358-59. The author, however, concludes that the Gertz balance is "insuffi­
ciently sensitive to first amendment considerations when applied to corporate plain­
tiffs." Id. at 358. 
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Corporations can be classified as public or private figures in 
nearly the same manner as individuals are presently classified. The 
Court in Gertz defined the group subject to public figure status as 
"[t]hose who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or 
the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, 
are properly classed as public figures ...."82 It further divided 
that category into two groups: public figures for all purposes and 
public figures for limited circumstances. 83 This approach serves 
corporate plaintiffs as well as natural persons by providing a 
standard which judges can apply with a certain degree of consist­
ency. There are admittedly some differences between corporations 
and natural persons, the most significant being that a corporation is 
purely a legal and intangible entity. It may be helpful, therefore, 
to identify certain factors which a court could consider in applying 
the public figure classification to corporations. 
In certain instances, "the large corporation may merit classifi­
cation as a 'public figure' simply on the basis of its impact on the 
lives of its own employees. . . . "84 Moreover, such large corpora­
tions have such a pervasive effect on most aspects of our lives that 
they could be considered public figures under any circumstance. 85 
Other factors which have been suggested to aid judges in their 
determination whether a corporation is a public figure are annual 
sales of the corporation, total assets held, nature of the business 
the corporation is involved in, extent to which public exposure has 
been sought or avoided, and pervasiveness of the corporation's in­
fluence on sOciety.86 Also involved are the questions whether the 
corporation is stock or nonstock and whether the stock is publicly 
or privately held. The amount of public interest in the activities of 
the corporation would also be relevant, but by no means should it 
be the sole factor as commanded by Rosenbloom. The task of ap­
plying the public figure standards of Gertz to corporations is not 
beyond the capacity of judges or juries. 
82. 418 U.S. at 342. 
83. [d. at 343. See also note 35 supra. 
84. Note, Libel and the Corporate Plaintiff, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1496, 1507 
(1969). 
85. See generally Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 193 (1967) 
(Warren, c.J., concurring ). 
86. Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the 
Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 990 (1975). 
While recognizing that the question of corporate defamation and product dispar­
agement may often involve similar and interrelated legal inquiries, due to the nature 
of the court decision under analysis, the scope of this note is purposely limited to a 
discussion of the field of corporate libel. 
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Application of these criteria will result in many corporations 
being classified as public figures. On the other hand, a significant 
number of corporations, particularly smaller ones, would not qual­
ify under any of these considerations. Absent a sound basis war­
ranting classification as public figures, corporations should be al­
lowed to protect their reputations free of the burdens mandated by 
the actual malice standard. 
John P. James 
